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aRCHeoloGICal InTeRPReTaTIon of THe fRonTIeR 
baTTle aT MUD sPRInGs, nebRasKa 
Peter bleed and Douglas D. scott
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pbleed1@unl.edu
absTRaCT—Between February 4 and 7, 1865, Cheyenne, Sioux, and Arapaho warriors engaged a force of 
U.S. Army soldiers at Mud Springs, Nebraska. Historical records from both sides indicate that this fight marked 
an early phase of the Indian Wars. Based on systematic metal detections, firearms identification, and terrain 
analysis, this paper adds archeological insights into the arms and tactics used by the opposing sides. Well-armed 
Native fighters used terrain to approach U.S. troops, who maintained a defensive posture. U.S. soldiers appear 
to have dug a rifle pit to see approaching attackers.
Key Words: battlefield archeology, Civil War in the West, firearms identification, Indian Wars, viewshed analy-
sis, weapons fan analysis
INTRODUCTION
 Mud Springs is the modern name given to a perennial 
wetland in the uplands south of the North Platte River 
about 120 miles west of the fork of the South Platte. Native 
folks certainly used this area, but its modern designation 
was established by Oregon-California Trail emigrants 
who used the area as a watering and resting point (Fig. 1). 
In 1860 a Pony Express “home station” was built near 
the Mud Springs water hole (Corbett 2006), and the 
transcontinental telegraph line reached the station in July 
1861. These occupations created archeological records 
that warrant study, but this paper discusses the results of 
archeological research into fighting that occurred at Mud 
Springs on February 4-7, 1865, when it was the center of 
an armed conflict between troops of the U.S. Army and a 
body of Cheyenne, Sioux, and Arapaho.
 The Mud Springs fight offers an opportunity to dem-
onstrate how the holistic approach of modern battlefield 
archeology can augment historical sources to offer new 
interpretations of specific conflicts. Mud Springs was not 
as large as some other western battles, but it was longer 
and sharper than others. Unlike many fights that occurred 
in the open, the Mud Springs conflict involved defense of 
a fixed facility. It occurred as the Civil War was ending 
and before many tactical trends that marked the post-
war period of Indian warfare had begun (Griffith 1989; 
Jamieson 1994; Scott 2001). The U.S. Army had not yet 
developed a clear strategy for combating Native popula-
tions, so reports of events at Mud Springs (Collins 1865) 
contributed to development of the strategy that emerged 
in the next decade of the 19th century. Occupation of the 
West was still in an early phase. Military innovations of 
the Civil War, notably repeating firearms, were less com-
mon in the West than they would be in a relatively brief 
time. It also happens that Mud Springs has remarkably 
complete written accounts from both the army and Indian 
perspectives. These sources have been amply assembled 
and presented (Henderson 1951; Hyde 1983; Robrock 
1983; McDermott 1996, 2003; Halaas and Masich 2005). 
Finally, the site is well preserved both as a Nebraska State 
Historical landmark and is listed on the National Register 
of Historic Places as 25MO72, representing the conver-
gence of several significant historic events or themes.
 This paper summarizes the results of investigations 
carried out at Mud Springs. A full account of the results of 
those investigations is available in an unpublished techni-
cal report (Bleed and Scott 2008).
THE FIGHT AT MUD SPRINGS
 The Mud Springs fight was one of number of clashes 
that followed the November 29, 1864, destruction of Black 
Kettle’s village of Cheyenne (McDermott 2003; Greene 
and Scott 2004) by a regiment of Colorado Volunteers. In 
the wake of that assault, a large community of Cheyenne, 
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Sioux, and Arapaho coalesced and moved toward the se-
curity of the isolated Sandhills and the Black Hills. With 
relatively little opposition, this group attacked Julesburg, 
Colorado, and ranches and other facilities to avenge the 
massacre and to gather resources. The mobile community 
numbered some 2,000 to 3,000. They reached the North 
Platte in early February 1865 with a substantial store of 
captured arms and resources. By no later than February 
5, they established a camp at a place identified as “Rush 
Creek.” This site has not been specifically located, but it 
was probably in an area of natural springs near the head 
of modern Cedar Creek eight miles east of Mud Springs. 
Fighting at the Mud Springs Station may have started 
as the Rush Creek camp was being established, and for 
a couple of days it appears to have been the operational 
base from which fighters attacked Mud Springs. The Rush 
Creek camp, having many families and their gear, was 
a substantial base that was maintained until February 
8, when the Native community continued its northward 
journey. On the 8th and 9th, on the southern side of the 
North Platte, warriors covering their community’s move 
north met U.S. troops who had moved on from Mud 
Springs. This engagement has come to be called the 
Battle of Rush Creek.
 As shown in an 1864 ground plan, the Mud Springs 
Station consisted of two log buildings and a corral. One 
building measured 35 × 16 feet and served as a squad 
room and telegraph office. The other building was a stable 
that measured 40 × 20 feet. These buildings were not 
designed for defense; rather, they were built as a working 
unit on the overland trail system. The structures sat on the 
west side of dry wash that served as the path of the “Jules 
Figure	1.	Aerial	view	of	the	Mud	Springs	Station	site	(25MO72).
[
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Cutoff,” a shortcut that provided Oregon Trail travelers 
a way around the steep hill at Ash Hollow. The station 
buildings were on a land surface some 10 feet above the 
wash and separated by a low bank. A wetland, possibly 
blocked to form a shallow pond, formed the northern 
margin of the station. A lightly built corral was located 
next to the stable, apparently to the west.
 Sir Richard Burton, an English sportsman who on 
August 12, 1860, passed through the Pony Express station 
on his westward travels, described it:
The station-house was not unlike an Egyptian 
Fellah’s hut. The material was sod, half peat 
with vegetable matter; it is taken up in large 
flakes after being furrowed with the plough, 
and is cut to proper lengths with a short-
handled spade. Cedar timber, brought from the 
neighbouring hills, formed the roof. The only 
accommodation was an open shed, with a sort 
of doorless dormitory by its side. We dined in 
the shed, . . . Dreading the dormitory . . . of 
fleas . . . I cast about for a quieter retreat. For-
tune favoured me by pointing out the body of a 
dismantled wagon. (Burton 1963: 87-88)
 By 1865 the adobe structures appear to have been 
dismantled and rebuilt with logs, as described by A. G. 
Shaw, a battle participant with the 11th Ohio Volunteer 
Cavalry:
There were several buildings, and rooms con-
nected or a part of the same building. The Indi-
ans got behind the hill in the rear of the buildings 
& would crawl to the top and shoot down into 
the log buildings. There were no windows on 
that side, but occasionally a bullet went through 
the chinking and penetrated to the inside, but 
nobody was hurt. (Jensen 2005:304)
 The station complex is surrounded by a variety of 
topographic features (Fig. 1). Immediately east of the 
buildings there is a broad sandy draw. The level of the 
station is separated from the draw by a bank that is steep 
in some areas but less than 20 inches high. A series of hills 
is located to the south of the building site. The closest of 
these is less than 100 yards away and directly overlooks 
the buildings. The buildings have not survived, but their 
location is marked, based on oral traditions, by a stone 
monument erected in 1939. The site has not been system-
atically tested, but in 1995 it was assessed with ground 
penetration radar (Steinacher 1995). Specific anomalies 
were not identified.
 The Mud Springs fight is presented by both army and 
Indian accounts, which have been assembled by John 
McDermott (1996, 2003). The primary army accounts are 
the after-action report of Col. William Collins of the 11th 
Ohio Volunteer Cavalry (Collins 1865; Hewett 1997:203-
33). The Native perspective is represented in accounts 
of the fight left by George Bent, the son of noted trader 
William Bent and his Cheyenne wife, who rode with his 
Indian kinsmen (Haack n.d.; Grinnell 1956; Hyde 1983; 
Halaas and Masich 2005).
 As recorded in these accounts, fighting at Mud 
Springs began in the morning of February 4. At that time, 
the site was occupied by a telegrapher, nine soldiers of 
the 11th Ohio Volunteer Cavalry, and four local cowboys 
who had a small herd of cattle as well as horses and mules 
in the station corral. Indians attacked, driving off the 
cattle and a number of horses. They did not immediately 
cut the telegraph wire, however, so word of the attack 
was quickly sent down the line. For the remainder of 
the 4th, the defenders stayed in the station buildings and 
traded shots with the attackers. Indians attacked both on 
horseback and on foot. They appear to have been able to 
approach the station building closely.
 George Bent described the opening phase of the Mud 
Springs fight in a May 4, 1906, letter to George Hyde. 
This letter has been cited by several authors (Grinnell 
1956; Hyde 1983:183-89; Halaas and Masich 2005), but 
the original text transcribed by Stephen Haack presents 
useful information:
That night scouts were sent ahead reported 
ranch on Muddy Springs had soldiers, so 
early next morning everybody got on their best 
horses and started for the springs. The village 
turned north east from here. We went due north 
for the ranch. When we got near we could hear 
lots of firing. Lot of Indians had started for 
this place that night so as to run the stock, but 
soldiers had all their animals inside the corral. 
The soldiers were inside of buildings and had 
port holes to shoot through. We could not tell 
how many soldiers were in this party. Sand 
creek ran close to the ranch with high bank. 
The Indians got behind this bank and shot into 
the buildings. At noon they turned all their ani-
mals loose. The mules and horses ran in every 
direction. Indians were running after them. 
Among rules with Indians, who touched the 
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animal with anything in his hand, the animal 
was his. I understood the soldiers were running 
out of ammunition.  They turned their stock 
loose so the Indians would leave them and they 
did so. After this the big village camped about 
[he gives no number here] miles east of Muddy 
Springs where we had fight. No Indians were 
killed in this fight and as I say we could not 
tell how many whites were killed in this fight. 
Lots of shooting was done on both sides. All the 
guns we ever captured were Spencer carbines. 
They were the best guns at that time and were 
handy to carry on horses. (Haack n.d.:33-34)
 Bent’s recollections present a number of useful in-
sights. First, he makes it clear that Indian fighters were 
well armed and that from the outset there was consider-
able shooting. He clearly states that the station defenders 
shot from loopholes made in the station wall. It is also 
significant that although Bent does not mention attacks 
from the hill south of the station, his account indicates 
that the bank of the sandy draw on the east side of the 
station let the attackers draw very close to the defenders’ 
base and that the attackers heavily used the bank.
 Colonel Collins and his cavalry were about 90 miles 
west of Mud Springs at Fort Laramie when word of the 
attack was received (Collins 1865; Jones 2005). On the 
evening of the February 4, he set out to relieve the sta-
tion with some 120 men, including companies of the 11th 
Ohio Volunteer Cavalry and some men of the 7th Iowa 
Volunteer Cavalry. He also ordered a relief party of Lt. 
William Ellsworth and 36 men of Company H, 11th Ohio 
Volunteer Cavalry, stationed at Fort Mitchell, to Mud 
Springs. Ellsworth arrived early on February 5. Collins 
arrived early on the 6th, having ridden for two nights. An 
overnight ride in midwinter must have been a demanding 
effort, but the weather appears to have been quite mild. 
Temperature records at Fort Laramie record the afternoon 
high on February 5 at 48 degrees (Fahrenheit) (J. Preston, 
personal communication, Wyoming Water Resources, 
March 23, 2006). In a letter written in 1906, George Bent 
recollected, “There was no snow on the ground although 
it was February. Winter of 1865 was open winter” (Haack 
n.d.:34).
 The newly arrived army troops established a corral of 
wagons and other materials adjacent to the station. They 
kept their stock in this confine and used it as a defensive 
line for most of February 5. Army troopers were armed 
with Spencer rifles or carbines. Indians were described as 
using repeating rifles, revolvers, and bows and arrows. In 
his report presented in the Official Report of the War of 
the Rebellion, Collins (1865) described the fighting on the 
6th as a game of “bo-peep” in which both the army and In-
dian fighters searched out sheltered spots from which they 
could stand and surprise their adversaries. The warriors 
were attracted to horses in the expanded corral. They also 
harassed the station on horseback and on foot, using the 
terrain as effective cover to draw close to the station. The 
fighting spread over a wide area, with mounted Indians 
alternately charging the station and taking shelter from 
soldiers’ rifle fire by galloping behind far hills.
 On February 6, the fighting became quite intense. Col-
lins estimated that between 500 and 1,000 Indian fight-
ers were involved in the attack. Based on estimates by 
other observers, McDermott (2003:38) believes the higher 
number is the most accurate. In addition to continuing to 
try to drive off horses and mules penned in the corral, 
Indians also brought groups of up to 200 individuals to 
the top of the hill immediately south of the station. This 
brought them within 75 yards of the station buildings and 
allowed them to send in volleys of bullets and arrows. 
To deal with those attacks, on the afternoon of the 6th 
Collins organized an assault by mounted and unmounted 
troopers on the hill south of the station. After that as-
sault, Indians abandoned the high ground, and troopers 
occupied it. They even dug a “rifle pit” on the hilltop 
(McDermott 2003:39).
 With a secure perimeter and another detachment of 
50 men of the 11th Ohio Volunteer Cavalry, who arrived 
from Fort Laramie with a cannon late on the 6th, the army 
was able to leave the station confines. On the 7th, Collins 
sent out scouting parties to locate the main Indian camp. 
Following well-worn trails, the scouts easily located it. 
On the morning of the 8th, Collins led a force of some 185 
troopers out of Mud Springs to pursue the Cheyenne and 
their allies, who were by that time breaking their Rush 
Creek camp and heading across the North Platte. At that 
point, the battle of Mud Springs was over.
 In sum, the Mud Springs battle involved more than 
200 U.S. troops and upwards of 1,000 Indian fighters. 
The two sides fought for more than three days, using a 
variety of firearms and traditional weapons. Casualties 
are uncertain but seem light. No army soldiers were killed 
outright in the fighting, and no Indian bodies were ob-
served, although army participants suggested that some 
30 of their adversaries had been dispatched. George Bent 
says no Indians were killed in the fighting at Mud Springs 
(Hyde 1983:193). The fight did not mark a decisive point 
in frontier military history, but the formal report Col-
lins prepared on the fight appears to have been read and 
Archeological	Interpretation	of	the	Frontier	Battle	at	Mud	Springs	•	Peter Bleed and Douglas D. Scott 17
©	2009	Center	for	Great	Plains	Studies,	University	of	Nebraska–Lincoln
considered by military leaders (McDermott 2003:35-45). 
Combat of this period also contributed to formation of 
post-Civil War military policies in the American West 
(Hatch 2003).
Questions about the Mud Springs Fight
 Since few historic battles have been investigated in 
the Central Plains, the site presents an opportunity to 
identify the archeological characteristics of set, multiday 
battles in this environment. There were also specific 
uncertainties about the Mud Springs fight that were clari-
fied with archeological materials. The most obvious of 
these is the armaments used by the Indian fighters. Army 
soldiers carried Spencer repeating carbines or rifles and 
other regulation weapons. It was not known what kinds 
of arms Indian fighters carried, but they were identified 
by recovered bullets and cartridge cases.
 The limits of the battlefield and the extent of the con-
tested zone were not known. The tactics of the fight were 
also unclear. Descriptions of “bo-peep” exchanges and 
firing volleys at charging mounted warriors seem graph-
ic, but it is not clear what they actually involved. Where 
did attackers and defenders position themselves? How 
was local terrain used to support these tactics? How was 
volley fire aimed? The role of the rifle pit also required 
investigation. The size and shape of the pit needed to be 
clarified to determine how it conformed to standard Civil 
War-era entrenchment practice. Excavation determined 
that the pit is truly an artificial feature and is associated 
with the fight. By assessing the location of the pit relative 
to other terrain features of the battle, one can suggest the 
strategic intentions behind its construction and its role in 
the fight.
FIELD AND ANALYTICAL METHODS
 Since a primary research goal of the Mud Springs 
inventory was to locate and define the limits of the battle-
field, it was necessary to determine where artifacts were 
found, but also where artifacts were not found. The first 
requirement, then, was to develop field procedures that 
were capable of examining the entire extent of the battle-
field. The area to be inventoried was relatively small, 
totaling some 40 acres. It was assumed that most surviv-
ing artifacts of war are either metallic or associated with 
metal, and metal detectors were employed as an inventory 
tool because of the success of the technique at Little Big-
horn Battlefield National Monument (Scott and Fox 1987; 
Scott et al. 1989) and its wide use since then.
 Locational control was accomplished through the 
use of a Global Positioning System handheld unit and 
electronic data collector. As artifacts were found, each 
item or location was recorded on the data recorder. Each 
was identified by unique UTM coordinates and a previ-
ously established identification code. The recovery crew 
followed and carefully uncovered subsurface finds and 
identified the finds. Inventory operations were designed 
primarily to locate subsurface metallic items with the 
use of electronic metal detectors. The operators walked 
transects by topographic feature orientation. The area 
examined included the immediate area around the Mud 
Springs Station buildings, the purported corral area to 
the west, and up to the banks of the present pond on the 
north. The areas between the station site and the hill to the 
south and the steep creek bank were examined in detail, 
as was the rolling hills to the west for one-quarter mile. 
The first and second terraces of the creek on the east were 
also metal-detected, but no historic finds were made. The 
creek is an active fluvial channel, and only modern items 
were found on the sweeps below the stream bank. Either 
the area has been flushed by flooding events or the older 
surfaces are buried beyond modern metal-detector depth 
range.
 The archeological integrity of the Mud Springs battle 
appears good. There are reports that cartridges have been 
collected around the station site. The area has also been vis-
ited by collectors with metal detectors. Previous searches 
of the site seems not to have been systematic or intensive, 
though, and there are no signs of serious earth moving.
Archeological Assemblage
 Cartridges, cartridge cases, and bullets form the 
majority of the artifacts recovered at Mud Springs. A 
full discussion of these materials is presented in Bleed 
and Scott (2008). The Nebraska State Historical Society 
also has a small collection of items collected from or 
near the presumed site of the buildings at Mud Springs 
Station. Since precise recovery points were not known, 
these items were not analyzed as part of this project. 
Systematically recovered materials were analyzed using 
standard firearms identification procedures (Gunther and 
Gunther 1935; Hatcher 1943; Hatcher et al. 1977; Harris 
1980; Heard 1997; Haag 2006) in order to determine the 
kind of arm, and where possible, the specific weapon that 
fired the materials. This then allowed determination of 
the number of different types of guns in use at the battle. 
Further, comparing the unique qualities of individual fire-
arm types allows us to identify individual weapons. This 
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capability is very important because we can use identi-
cal individual characteristics, coupled with the precise 
artifact locations, to trace the movements of individual 
weapons across the field of battle. With this information, 
patterns of movement can be established and the battle 
sequence can be more precisely interpreted.
 In total, 44 cartridges, cases, and bullets in the sys-
tematically recovered assemblage could be dated to the 
period of the battle. These were fired from the following 
weapons: .36-caliber Starr revolver, .44-caliber Henry 
rifle, .44-caliber Ballard carbine, .54-caliber Leman rifle, 
.56-56-caliber Spencer and Joslyn carbines, and .58-cali-
ber rifled musket, which might be either a rebored M1841 
rifle, or a M1855, a M1861, a M1863, or an Enfield P53 
rifled musket. Additionally, a single “top hat” or “musket 
cap” was found during the test excavation of the rifle pit. 
The cap is unfired, as it bears no tool marks from being 
struck by a hammer (Weber and Scott 2006:131-43).
 Beyond identifying the kinds of guns used at Mud 
Springs, firearm identification of the archeologically 
recovered materials indicates that there were at least 21 
different firearms used during the 1865 Mud Springs 
battle. This number includes at least one .36-caliber Starr 
revolver, one .44-caliber Colt M1860 army revolver, two 
.44-caliber Henry rifles, five .44-caliber Ballard carbines, 
one .54-caliber Leman rifle, two .56-56-caliber Joslyn 
carbines, eight 56-56 Spencer carbines, and one .58-cali-
ber rifled musket.
Firearms Artifact Distribution
 Total artifact recovery was limited given the sampling 
technique employed. It was also no surprise that only a 
small number of artifacts were recovered given the land-
owner’s statements that he has allowed relic hunters on 
the site on a routine basis, as long as they asked permis-
sion. He recalled that previous collectors found handfuls 
of Spencer and other cartridge cases.
 Nevertheless, the archeologically recovered cartridge 
cases and bullets do not appear to be randomly distrib-
uted. Rather, the find pattern distribution is consistent 
with the historic battle accounts. The Spencer and Joslyn 
cartridge cases representing eight and two separate guns, 
respectively, were found scattered around the traditional 
location of the buildings at Mud Springs Station. Car-
tridge cases fired from those same guns were found on 
the north side of the hill and on top of the hill south of the 
station as well as in a low area between the south hill and 
a rise to the west. This distribution is consistent with the 
army accounts of the battle, which have the soldiers forti-
fying the station even after arrival of the relief columns. 
The Spencer and Joslyn cartridge cases found around the 
south hill and to the west are also consistent with Colonel 
Collins’s report of making a mounted sortie to the south 
and driving the attacking warriors from the hill and the 
general area.
 The .44-caliber Ballard cartridge cases, representing 
five guns, and the .44-caliber Henry cartridge cases, rep-
resenting two guns, were recovered either on the rise or 
ridge to the southwest of the station buildings or behind 
a low rise on the lower west flank of the south hill. This 
distribution, along with that of the bullets, is consistent 
with positions the warriors utilized.
 The 11th Ohio Volunteer Cavalry is known to have 
been armed in 1864 with Spencer, Smith, and Merrill car-
bines as well as M1847 Musketoons (McAulay 1996:54). 
In 1865 only Spencers are reported (McAulay 1996:64). 
The 7th Iowa Volunteer Cavalry is reported to be armed 
with the Gallager carbine in 1864 (McAulay 1996:52), 
but there is no information reported for 1865. The Smith, 
Merrill, and Gallager carbines were all percussion ignition 
types and not cartridge firearms (McAulay 1981:32-35, 
40-44, 62-68). Neither unit was reported to have been 
armed with the Joslyn carbine. However, ordnance returns 
for Union Civil War units are notoriously incomplete, and 
uncritical reliance on them is inappropriate. Certainly 
given the archeological context, it appears the units were 
likely armed with Spencer and Joslyn carbines both firing 
the same type of metallic cartridge ammunition.
 The Ballard rimfire carbine and the Henry rifle were 
likely in warrior hands. Neither weapon type was new or 
unknown in the western regions. Both also employed the 
same caliber metallic cartridge, the .44-caliber rimfire.
 The only other recovered artifact that is likely to be 
part of the battle debris is the strap bar segment of a brass 
1859-pattern cavalry spur found near the station site.
“RIFLE PIT” FEATURE ExCAVATION AND 
INTERPRETATION
 Given the mention that Collins’s troops dug a rifle pit 
after they arrived at Mud Springs, a depression observed 
on the top of the hill south of the Mud Springs Station 
(Fig. 2) deserved specific investigation and documenta-
tion. Expedient defenses have a long military history. 
They were used in Civil War engagements but are pre-
sumed to be less common in western fights. Surviving 
examples of Civil War-era rifle pits are quite rare.
 There are a number of “blowouts” that interrupt the 
sod on the hilltop. These may be why Henderson (1951) 
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mentions multiple “pits,” but only one of the interrup-
tions appears to be evidence of a consciously excavated 
feature. Some oral history associated with this feature 
appears to conflict with the assumption that it is the pit 
Collins reported to have excavated during the fighting at 
Mud Springs. Scott Cape, the current landowner, related 
that his father had been told that this feature was a pio-
neer woman’s burial site until her remains were moved to 
another location.
 The observed depression was roughly circular, ap-
proximately 2 m in diameter and about 20 cm lower than 
the surrounding ground level. The test unit opened to 
assess the depression was laid out across what appeared 
to be the western margin of the original pit. The profile 
of the south wall of the test unit, however, did not reveal 
a clear, excavated edge. Below the thin layer of matted 
vegetation, the pit fill consisted of mixed gray sand that 
contained charcoal flecks and artifacts, including the 
mid-portion of a bifacially flaked projectile point, four 
flake fragments, and an unused percussion cap. There 
was no apparent edge to this level that might reflect the 
excavated edge of a rifle pit, but it was thickest toward 
the center of the depression. Below the gray sand layer, 
the soil consisted of more solidly compacted sandy loam. 
The divide between this layer and the mixed sand was 
distinct enough to potentially reflect an artificial surface. 
No artifacts were found below this level. The top of the 
undisturbed sandy loam seems to form a gentle depres-
sion that at its deepest point is some 60 cm below the 
current soil surface.
 Test excavation of the potential rifle pit indicates that 
it is a shallow artificial feature that was excavated to have 
sloping sides. Little more can be said about its original 
size and shape, but it seems very uncertain that it could 
have served as even a temporary burial site. The combi-
nation of stone artifacts and a percussion cap strongly 
suggests that the area of the pit had a complex history. 
Given the historical mention of a rifle pit, and pending 
further investigation, we believe that the hilltop feature 
can be interpreted as a simple excavation linked to the 
Mud Springs fight.
MARTIAL CONTExTS OF MUD SPRINGS:
ARMY AND INDIAN TACTICS IN THE
MID-19TH CENTURY
 The Napoleonic Wars and the U.S.-Mexican War 
(1846-48) heavily influenced army tactical doctrine during 
Figure	2.	View	south	across	the	Mud	Springs	Station	site	to	the	hill	occupied	by	warriors	and	the	army	during	the	battle.
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the early years of the Civil War. Officers learned this 
approach to warfare during their education at the West 
Point military academy and in the field during the Civil 
War. The basic tactic taught at West Point prior to the 
Civil War was close-order infantry assaults with bayo-
nets gleaming, cavalry charges with sabers flashing, and 
direct fire by smoothbore artillery placed toward the front 
of the line. These tactics, through hard-learned lessons of 
the Civil War, gave way by 1863 to a different approach 
(Griffith 1986, 1989). By the last years of the war, tactics 
had adapted to the effectiveness of modern rifled arms. 
Infantry tactics were modified to open-order skirmish 
lines using available cover whenever possible. Defensive 
positions were usually fortified with extensive entrench-
ments. Prepared rifle pits, picket posts, and videttes usu-
ally protected even short-term camps.
 Of the three combat branches, cavalry made the 
greatest adaptation during the latter part of the Civil 
War, continuing these tactics during the Indian Wars 
(Russell 1987; Jamieson 1994). In battle it moved from 
the close-order charge meant to break or outflank a line 
to a mobile unit that could move quickly to the scene of 
action, then dismount and fight as light infantry. With 
the advent of breech-loading single-shot and repeating 
carbines, cavalry firepower increased dramatically. This 
increased firepower and mobility allowed the cavalry to 
regain the usefulness on the battlefield it had lost with the 
introduction of the rifled musket. Cavalry was also used 
extensively throughout the Civil War and Indian Wars as 
a fast and efficient scouting and intelligence-gathering 
arm. Mobility was its key asset; cavalry units could range 
far and wide around larger, marching columns to protect 
them and to scout the opponent’s movements.
 In general, the nature of conflict between soldiers and 
Indians was unique and afforded some major differences 
in the way each group of combatants conducted warfare. 
Within the Indians’ cultural context, fighting was usually 
accomplished as individuals or in loosely affiliated war 
groups. Fighting usually employed surprise, ambush, 
and decoy (Grinnell 1910, 1956; Smith 1937; Secoy 1992; 
DeMallie and Parks 2003:66-76). Tactically, warriors 
employed the terrain to their benefit, striking quickly in 
small groups as opportunities presented themselves. The 
U.S. Army was constantly frustrated by the Indian hit-
and-run tactic (White 1978). Also, frontier army officers 
and men had little understanding of the Plains Indian’s 
war-honor concept of counting coup, which was so in-
grained within their cultural construct to achieve hero 
status within the group (McGinnis 1990). Aside from 
touching an opponent, one could gain other levels of dis-
tinction by capturing a weapon from a live enemy, steal-
ing a horse, or rescuing a fallen warrior from the enemy. 
Regardless, destruction of an enemy or protection of the 
family or band were paramount in combat, and inflicting 
casualties on the enemy by killing or wounding was a 
natural outcome of such tactics.
 The tactics employed by both sides during the Mud 
Springs fight are evident in the patterned distribution 
of the archeological record. When that record is supple-
mented by the application of firearm identification proce-
dures, the actual movement of both soldiers and warriors 
is clearly seen. Individual warriors availed themselves 
of the protective cover provided by the terrain within 
gunshot range of the Mud Springs Station buildings. The 
soldiers, employing those buildings as a fixed defense, 
utilized tactics current with late-Civil War fighting 
proscriptions. When Collins arrived, he took an aggres-
sive posture and literally charged the warriors’ positions 
with his men, forcing the tribesmen to vacate the area. 
Those events deposited physical evidence on the ground 
in patterns that remained to be recovered during the ar-
cheological investigations. That evidence was recovered, 
and the patterns of deposition reflect the fighting methods 
employed by both sides. Yet there were still questions to 
be answered that were not fully reflected in the recovered 
data set.
LOOKING AT THE MUD SPRINGS LANDSCAPE: 
TERRAIN ANALYSIS
 The Mud Springs rifle pit presented a special chal-
lenge. Use of hasty entrenchments was certainly an 
established tactic by the mid-19th century, but it is not 
clear why the leader of a cavalry detachment decided to 
“dig in” shortly after breaking the siege at Mud Springs. 
Likewise, it is not clear why the pit was dug where it was. 
Those questions offered an opportunity to reassess the 
documentary and oral history resources from yet another 
angle. The approach chosen was viewshed analysis, which 
employs the power of Geographic Information System 
(GIS) computer-based programs. Viewshed analysis is 
a GIS technique that makes it possible to identify views 
and vistas available from a given point. It has become a 
refined archeological tool (Wheatley and Gillings 2002) 
that can expose settlement choices (Jones 2006) and vi-
sual landscapes (Llobera 2007). In military parlance this 
is known as terrain analysis or weapons fan analysis.
 Viewshed analysis is a fairly straightforward tech-
nique that, when calculated on the computer, is facilitated 
by files known as digital elevation models (DEMs). A 
Archeological	Interpretation	of	the	Frontier	Battle	at	Mud	Springs	•	Peter Bleed and Douglas D. Scott 21
©	2009	Center	for	Great	Plains	Studies,	University	of	Nebraska–Lincoln
standard DEM is essentially the same as a digital image, 
a matrix of cells containing a given color value, with the 
important exception that in a DEM, instead of storing 
color information, the cells of a DEM store elevation data. 
This grid of cells is known as a raster dataset. For this 
analysis, each cell or pixel within the DEM represents the 
elevation of a square plot of land, in this case 10 m on a 
side. The elevation data may then be used by the computer 
to calculate viewsheds from any point or set of points on 
the landscape.
 When calculating a viewshed from a given point, the 
computer simply tests each cell in the raster to see if a 
straight line can be interpolated from the cell to the des-
ignated point without being obscured by another cell. If a 
cell representing a higher elevation value lies between the 
point and the cell being tested, then that cell being tested 
is considered invisible from the selected point. However, 
if no such intervening value is present, then the cell being 
tested is within the viewshed of the selected point. Each of 
the viewsheds calculated for this exercise used the avail-
able DEMs. These data do not project undergrowth, trees, 
or other vegetation that may have been present, which are 
minimal at the Mud Springs site. The calculations simply 
show what can be seen from a certain spot at a certain 
point above the ground for a certain distance without tak-
ing into account vegetation patterns. These patterns can 
then be correlated with the archeological and historical 
record as an additional validation tool.
 Weapons fan analysis is a military amplification of 
viewshed methodology. If a viewshed defines those areas 
of a landscape visible from a given point, weapons fan 
analysis combines the viewshed approach with technical 
information about the weaponry in actual use to determine 
potential targets to be had from a military emplacement. 
Weapons fan analysis builds easily on firearms analysis 
since it makes use of the same kinds of ballistic informa-
tion. The Mud Springs rifle pit’s calculated viewshed was 
based on the functional range of the firearms available at 
the time.
 Figure 3 presents the weapons fans that would have 
been available to soldiers or stockmen in the Mud Springs 
Station or for a picket stationed at the rifle pit on the hill to 
the south. It assumes a 700 m rifle range, the approximate 
limit of effective use for a Spencer carbine. It also as-
sumes that crouching shooters fired from window height, 
or 1 m. The calculated weapons fans show clearly that 
gunmen could see and cover most of the area around the 
station. There were two exceptions. The hill to the south 
of the station hid much of that area so that attackers could 
approach unseen to within 100 m of the station. The far 
horizons were both out of rifle range and not visible from 
the station. The archeological evidence shows that war-
riors used that landscape to fire on the occupants of the 
Mud Springs Station complex.
 Two long-distance viewsheds (Fig. 4) document that 
most of the areas visible from the station, together with 
distant vistas, were also visible for a 1.5-m-tall individual 
standing at the tested rifle pit. The hilltop did not reveal 
much that could not be seen from the station, but distant 
plains to the south and west were visible from the hilltop. 
Figure	3.	Comparison	of	the	weapons	fans	available	from	the	rifle	pit	(A)	and	from	the	station	buildings	(B).	These	fans	suggest	
that	shooting	from	the	hill	above	the	station	had	a	slight	advantage.
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An individual stationed in the rifle pit could easily see the 
areas to the north, south, and east, and warn of anyone ap-
proaching from those directions. The location especially 
afforded a good view of the territory to the east, which 
riders traveling back and forth between Mud Springs and 
the Rush Creek camp had to cross. Areas to the north, 
south, east, and immediately west of the station were vis-
ible enough to allow defenders to see anyone approaching 
from those directions.
 Clearly, the pit would have been a good lookout post. 
But since soldiers could see farther than they could shoot, 
the weapons fan from the pit is very different from its 
distant viewshed. The hilltop weapons fan did reach a 
few areas that could not be hit from the station, but it was 
far less than perfect. It was certainly fragmented, so that 
warriors could approach from the west unseen to within 
20 m of the pit. Beyond that, the hill to the southwest 
of the station covered an area big enough to serve as a 
staging area for mounted raids. The pit was thus not well 
placed for combative defense of the soldiers’ position. If 
the rifle pit was occupied by soldiers after breaking the 
station siege, other pickets or guards must have covered 
the western approaches. If the pit was occupied in order to 
provide a view of attackers coming from the south, it was 
an effective location that allowed for ample time to warn 
those camped around or in the station. On the other hand, 
if the pit was constructed by the besieging warriors, then 
they had an excellent tactical position to pour fire into the 
station and corral while maintaining excellent protection 
for the pit occupants. Given that their warrior kinsmen 
were on their western flank, a view of that area may not 
have been necessary.
CONCLUSIONS
 Archeological investigations of the Mud Springs 
battlefield present clear evidence that even the relatively 
small conflicts of the Great Plains frontier left physical 
evidence that can be archeologically recovered and inter-
preted to augment other records. Mud Springs also shows 
that even though western combat may have involved 
hundred of fighters and days of conflict, it is likely to be 
evidenced only by broad artifact distributions that require 
close analysis.
 The artifact distribution across the landscape indi-
cates that during the fight, warriors used the available 
terrain to their advantage. They fired at the station from 
behind the crest of the south hill, from behind a small rise 
on its lower flanks, and from behind a rise to the west. All 
locations were well within the range of the warriors’ fire-
arms and the range of return fire from soldiers and civil-
ians in the station. The archeological assemblage suggests 
that the two sides that met at Mud Springs were in one 
way surprisingly well matched. Indian fighters appear to 
have had a wider array of arms than U.S. troops, but the 
armaments of the two sides seem fully comparable. The 
fighting left material signatures that suggest, however, 
that the two sides were tactically mismatched.
 Recovered ammunition is consistent with intense fire 
from near the station. Volley fire at mounted fighters and 
Figure	4.	Comparison	of	the	2,500	m	viewsheds	from	the	rifle	pit	(A)	and	the	station	site	(B).	Clearly,	a	fuller	view	was	available	
from	the	rifle	pit.
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shots by mounted raiders, which are described in his-
torical accounts of the fight, are not readily apparent even 
though hills and surfaces well removed from the station 
were surveyed. Archeologically, the margins of the Mud 
Springs battle were very hard to recognize. In part this 
may be due to indiscriminant relic collecting over the 
years, and to flooding and other fluvial events in the area 
where the creek has changed the landform. However, the 
rifle pit excavated to the south of the station can best be 
interpreted as a defensive lookout post. It suggests that 
most of the time, U.S. troops maintained an entirely de-
fensive posture. A strong perimeter appears to have been 
augmented by a sentinel who could both see approaching 
enemy and possibly discourage furtive attacks. There 
is no evidence that troops were massed or arrayed in 
strength anywhere but at the station itself.
 Indian warriors employed a very different approach to 
the Mud Springs fight. Artifact distribution together with 
viewshed and weapons fan analyses suggest that the ter-
rain around Mud Springs supported hit-and-run tactics, 
stealthy attack, and mounted forays. At least some Indian 
shots were taken from open areas west of the station, and, 
according to historical accounts, the warriors appear to 
have used the available terrain, including the creek bank, 
to their advantage during the fight. The warriors fired at 
the station from behind the crest of the south hill, from 
behind a small rise on its lower flanks, from protection 
of the creek bank to the east, and from behind a rise to 
the west. The general situation appears to be a classic 
example of Native American fighting traditions of hit-
and-run tactics, employing maximum cover to minimize 
exposure, and using superior numbers to pin down op-
ponents in order to take the stock, supplies, or other war 
booty (Secoy 1992).
 The U.S. Army was constantly frustrated by Indian 
hit-and-run tactics throughout most of the mid- to late 
19th century. Organized effort, dependence on techno-
logical advantage, and defense of fixed facilities judged 
important marked U.S. military thinking of the day and 
is reflected in the archeological record of the defense of 
Mud Springs Station. Such tactical thinking was just 
beginning to undergo a marked change and to be carried 
to fruition over the next few years as warfare with the 
various Plains tribes reached its zenith. The warriors’ 
use of the terrain to maneuver and to provide cover and 
maximum protection to the combatants is also amply 
reflected in the archeological record. A combination 
of analytical techniques, evaluation of historical and 
oral history sources, interpretation of the archeological 
record, and GIS-based terrain analysis provides a more 
complete view of the events at Mud Springs in February 
1865. Aside from precisely locating battle events in space, 
the Mud Springs artifact distribution provides clear evi-
dence of the different fighting styles of the two combatant 
groups, demonstrating the U.S. Army’s versus the Plains 
Indians’ manner of fighting and defense. Viewed in light 
of the expanding array of analytical techniques of modern 
battlefield research, Mud Springs offers an archeological 
reflection of those cultural differences in the practice of 
war and warfare.
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